Interestingly enough, when we control for territorial contiguity and strategic rivalries within these dyads, MAD retains some significance—if only marginally at the. When a nuclear monopoly exists between two states, and their opponent does not, there is a greater chance of war.
It would appear in the works of Lindsay, Gartzke, Haggard, and others that cyber conflict conforms to the stability-instability logic in the same way that conventional forms of conflict do. Second, these results appear to confirm the suspicions of traditional deterrence theorists like Barretta.
Some nuclear weapons are designed for special purposes; a neutron bomb is a thermonuclear weapon that yields a relatively small explosion but a relatively large amount of neutron radiation ; such a device could theoretically be used to cause massive casualties while leaving infrastructure mostly intact and creating a minimal amount of fallout.
In order to add value to this conversation, however, this study must be consistent in its theoretical structure, clear in its operationalization of variables, and honest in noting the limitations of potential findings.
Full Models with Advanced Controls Discussion But what accounts for these puzzling shifts in the full model. The latter approach is considered more sophisticated than the former, and only the latter approach can be used if the fissile material is plutonium.
Scholars of international relations, however, have found reason to be critical of both theories. For this reason, it is helpful to think of the framework as a pyramid—with nuclear war at the pinnacle and low-intensity conflict at the base.
The Stability-Instability Paradox - To achieve their security objectives by other means, states locked in nuclear deterrence conduct higher frequency low-intensity conflict, which is less likely to escalate to conventional war and even less likely to escalate into nuclear war.
To authors like Lindsay, cyber capabilities represent the energized lower end of the conflict spectrum and the unthinkable peak of escalation—the pinnacle and the base of the pyramid. With these two main limitations in mind, it is important to note that this is merely a starting point.
When a nuclear monopoly exists between two states, and their opponent does not, there is a greater chance of war. Methods As explained above, even a rudimentary quantitative analysis of the nuclear stability-cyber instability paradox will be useful to a growing body of relevant research.
With a significance level of. Deterrence optimists assume that nuclear conflict will be negotiated by great, responsible powers.
The development of information and communications technology ICT has erupted over the past century. Weapons whose explosive output is exclusively from fission reactions are commonly referred to as atomic bombs or atom bombs abbreviated as A-bombs.
To ensure a more suitable, normally distributed dependent variable without losing any observations, incident severity is cut to a smaller scale from 1 to 5. These results are a modest start, but they already suggest that the dynamics of the stability-instability paradox imposed by the presence of nuclear arms may be at play.
First, all findings and implications of this study must be taken with an understanding of the limited observations available.
When imagining a theocratic nation whose leaders believe in the existence of an afterlife which they assume to be sufficiently better than our current life, it becomes rational for them to do everything in their power to facilitate a swift transition for as many people as possible into that afterlife.
And as revisionist powers continue to explore new means to aggravate and disrupt the status quo, it is difficult to imagine a situation where the nuclear stability-cyber instability paradox becomes any less relevant or problematic.
Analysis As discussed throughout the above section, testing of the nuclear stability-cyber instability hypothesis will be conducted across three models. In addition to contributing a cross-domain conception of the cyber domain and the deterrence paradox, this study will make this quantitative analysis a priority.
Cornell University Press. What follows from the stability-instability paradox is that new nuclear states that wish to revise the status quo in their favor may believe that their newfound nuclear shield may enable them to wage conventional wars to do so without the fear of nuclear retaliation.
Fall Penn State Journal of International Affairs7 The Stability-Instability Paradox: The Case of the Kargil War Anuj Panday, Emory University This paper examines the role of nuclear weapons in the Kargil War in and finds that. DETERRENCE INSTABILITY & NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA My essay, “The Myth of Deterrence Stability Between Nuclear-Armed Rivals,” argues that nuclear arsenals did not help stabilize the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union — even when both had ac.
Nuclear Stability, Conventional Instability: North Korea and the Lessons From Pakistan for why North Korea pursued nuclear weapons. the stability-instability paradox is that new nuclear. The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons Stability in the Postwar World I lohn Muezler that, for better or worse, the existence of nuclear I It is widely assumed.
However, the stability-instability paradox, a theory first introduced to the field by Glenn Snyder, offers a valuable framework for accommodating the pacifying and destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons.
To date, Jervis provides us with perhaps one of the clearest definitions of this framework.Nuclear weapons stability or instability